Please zoom in or out and select the base layer according to your preference to make the map ready for printing, then press the Print button above.

Shenhua's water intensive coal chemical project in Ordos, Inner Mongolia, China


Description:

On 23rd July 2013, Greenpeace published a report titled “Thirsty Coal 2: Shenhua’s Water Grab”, which put China Shenhua Energy Company Limited (China Shenhua)’s Coal-to-Liquid (CTL) Demonstration Project in Ordors, Inner Mongolia under scrutiny. The report, based on 11 site investigation trips by Greenpeace representatives between March and July 2013, disclosed the CTL project’s over-exploitation of groundwater and illegal wastewater discharge activities. [1] It was the first time that Greenpeace singled out and publicly challenged one of China’s most powerful state-owned enterprises. [2]

China Shenhua is the largest state-owned coal conglomerate in China. Commenced in 2002 [3], and located at Majiata Village in Ulan Moron Town (乌兰木伦镇) in Ordos which borders Shaanxi Province, Shenhua’s CTL project is one of the first and largest of its kind in China and also in the world, involving both direct and indirect liquefaction facilities. The CTL production base covers a total area of 1.735 square kilometers (173.5 hectares). [4] The project encompasses four areas of coal related operations, including coal mining, coal-fired thermal power, direct coal liquefaction and indirect coal liquefaction.[3] The coal used by the project comes from the Shenhua Bulianta Coal Mine and the Shenhua Shangwan Coal Mine, both of which are located in the immediate neighborhood of the project site. The main output of petroleum products include diesel, naphtha and liquefied petroleum gas, while supplementary products include industrial crude phenol and industrial sulfur.[5] The first phase of the project had a production capacity of 1.08 million tons of output a year as of 2013, which was expected to further expand to 5 million tons (phase 2 and phase 3) [2][6]. As a capital intensive project, the investment for the first phase of the project is approximately CNY 24.54 billion (USD 3.57 billion) [4][5].

According to Greenpeace, the project requires an average of 10 tons of fresh water per 1 ton of end-product output, while also producing 9 tons of carbon dioxide and 4.8 tons of waste water [5]. When the local water reserves had been exhausted near the project plant, Shenhua turned to the Haolebaoji (浩勒报吉) region in the heart of the Mu Us Desert (毛乌素沙漠), 100 km away from its plant location, to extract water. As of 2013, the project consumed approximately 14.4 million tons of water annually, while coal liquefaction accounts for the largest proportion (47%).[3] Based on the expansion plan of phase 2 and phase 3, it was expected that the project’s water use would triple to 41 million tons a year by 2017, according to Greenpeace. [2] The water extraction affects 2,402 households  (population of 5,752) from five villages (浩勒报吉村, 巴汗淖村, 阿刀亥村, 中乃村, 察汗庙嘎查) in the Haolebaoji farming and pastoral area [5][7]. Greenpeace representatives also noted seepage pits no more than 500 meters from Shenhua’s main office building, where industrial wastewater was being released and left to seep naturally into the ground. Samples of the discharged wastewater were sent to the Shanghai branch of SGS Laboratories and the Greenpeace Laboratory at the University of Exeter. The tests found high levels of harmful substances in the wastewater that was released from the discharge sites, including sulfide, Benzo(a)pyrene, and as many as 99 different types of semi-volatile organic compounds. This contradicts Shenhua’s own claim about its zero-discharge system that ensures zero pollutant discharged into the water cycle. [5]

During Shenhua’s application to build and run the CTL water extraction project, local villagers were never consulted. According to the timeline in Appendix I of Greenpeace’s report, the local villagers from Haolebaoji started to object to the project from as early as 2005.[5] Local villagers sent letters to Shenhua in their initial petition, but the project still went ahead without considering their concerns. In 2011 and 2013, local representatives of the National People’s Congress (NPC) submitted proposals twice in order to urge the municipal government to coordinate with the relevant state ministries and China Shenhua to stop extracting groundwater from the water source of Haolebaoji. [8] The NPC standing committee in Ordos (鄂尔多斯人大常委会) claimed that they were investigating the issue after receiving the feedback from the NPC representatives from Haolebaoji. [8] While the project was not stopped after villagers’ complaints and NPC representatives’ proposals, local villagers started to receive financial compensation of CNY 8,000 (USD 1,161) per year from 2012. However, this could hardly support the local villagers’ livelihood. According to a local NPC representative from Haolebaoji, the local government proposed the plan to relocate local villagers in 2005, but it was not implemented yet as of 2013. [9]

Besides, Shenhua also received fines by the local environmental protection bureaus from Ejin Horo Banner and Ordos municipality (伊金霍洛旗环保局和鄂尔多斯市环保局) in April 2013. According to a representative of Shenhua, the company had treated and reused three to four thousand tons of wastewater at a cost of CNY 120 (USD 17) per ton, as well as cleaned/restored the evaporation pond in response to the environmental protection authorities’ request.[10]

After the publication of the Greenpeace report, Shenhua responded immediately saying that the company took the allegations seriously and would start its own investigations. An environmental protection officer of the company admitted that the project had led to increasing grievances from local herders that tried to block the company’s gates. However, he denied that water extraction was the sole cause of ecological degradation in the reason. [2][6] Shenhua representatives also met with Greenpeace’s representatives to discuss the matter. On 8 August 2013, Shenhua sent to Greenpeace a document which explains the exploration activities at water origin areas and the associated ecological impact. On 16 August 2013, Shenhua followed up with another document that explains its wastewater discharge.[11]

On 26 August 2013, Greenpeace published an open letter to Shenhua to urge the company to be more transparent and respond more specifically to its inquiries regarding ecological degradation and local residents’ livelihood issues. There are three main appeals from Greenpeace: 1) Immediately stop the water pumping activities that destroy the farming and pastoral areas in Haolebaoji region where water has been extracted from 2) Publish, as soon as possible, the results of the reassessments of the impact of the Ordos coal-to-liquid project on water resources and environment 3) Carefully consider the expansion plan of the coal-to-liquid project, based on the principle of “determining production by water”.[12]

On 26 August 2013, two representatives from Greenpeace also brought their campaign to Shenhua’s mid-term financial result press release event in Hong Kong, where Shenhua is listed on the stock exchange.[13] While the Greenpeace representatives pointed to Shenhua’s water extraction and illegal wastewater discharge activities, the executive director and CEO of Shenhua, Ling Wen, denied the allegations and said that the company had obtained the approval of the state to use groundwater legally in the production process and recorded the water level data. He acknowledged that he had received Greenpeace’s open letter already and found it a pity that Greenpeace representatives still insisted on appearing at the press conference. [14] For Greenpeace, it was an occasion where they tried to convey their message to the press and investors, which they had been doing over the years on the topic of coal-related environmental issues. It was also mentioned by the representative of Greenpeace East Asia, that “We published our findings last July, only to find ourselves being faced with severe censorship. Many journalists attended our press conference - few could get their stories published.” This is also one of the reasons that they brought the campaign to Hong Kong, where there is fewer media censorship and also where Shenhua is listed.[13]

In addition to Greenpeace’s campaign efforts, a few other NGOs, including Friends of Nature (自然之友), Nature University (自然大学), the Centre for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, got involved and turned to public interest litigation as a tool to seek for legal justice. In mid-July 2013, two lawyers and two experts went on a trip to investigate the site in Ordos. Xie Yan, a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Zoology, believed that the wastewater dumped by Shenhua’s CTL project near the plant led to the soil contamination and the significant drop in groundwater levels, which echoed the findings included in Greenpeace's report that was published in late July.[10] However, both the Dongcheng District People’s Court in Beijing and the Intermediate People’s Court in Inner Mongolia refused to hear the case. [15][16] It was not a surprise to Hu Shaobo, one of the lawyers involved, since the Civil Procedure Law was only recently revised and that there was not yet detailed rules regarding the implementation, especially which types of entities are eligible to file environmental public interest litigation, as mentioned by Dongcheng District People’s Court.[10] [15] This particular case also led to a specific seminar regarding civil society’s pursuit of public interest litigation against large state-owned enterprises’ environmental pollution activities. The seminar was hosted at China Political and Legal University on 23 October 2013. The experts from environmental law and environmental NGOs agreed that it would be important to expand the scope of entities that are eligible to file environmental public interest litigations, which is a topic under discussion in the revision of the existing Environmental Protection Law of China.[15]

In April 2014, the local government of Haolebaoji announced that Shenhua would stop pumping groundwater in the neighborhood during 2014. [10] Besides, the herders living near water sources in Haolebaoji Township were told by the local government that they would be paid CNY 20,000 (USD 3,200) per person, plus 20,000 per household, as a compensation for the loss of water resources to industry, to be paid over three years. [9] In addition, Shenhua pledged that it had fitted the Ordos site with equipment that would allow it to recycle 98% of the water used there and that the water with high concentrations of pollutants would be treated in evaporation ponds.[17] However, the local villagers reacted cautiously in response to the verdict. On one hand, the villagers mentioned that since the installation of Shenhua’s pipes the Uxin Banner government had twice proposed a relocation plan of the herders, which never happened in reality. The herders also did not have full trust that the water pumping activities of Shenhua would stop in the near future, since it would be hard to find an alternative water source and that the Ordos government promised to provide a secure water supply for the CTL project in order to get the project to be located in Ordos. [10]

In 2017, Shenhua Group merged with China Guodian Corporation, which together became China Energy Investment Corporation (China Energy, 国家能源投资集团). As of 2018, it was announced by the CEO of China Energy, Ling Wen, that the phase 2 and phase 3 of the CTL project is in the preparation stage. [18] The phase 2 and phase 3 of the CTL project are also listed among the key projects in the “13th Five-Year-Plan for demonstration of deep processing of coal” (《煤炭深加工产业示范“十三五”规划》重点项目).[19] While the expansion has been long delayed, it remains unclear, if implemented, how the phase 2 and phase 3 of the Shenhua CTL project in Ordos would deal with the water access and local residents’ livelihood issues.

Basic Data

Name of conflict:Shenhua's water intensive coal chemical project in Ordos, Inner Mongolia, China
Country:China
State or province:Inner Mongolia
Location of conflict:Haolebaoji Township, Wushenzhao Town, Uxin Banner, Ordors
Accuracy of locationHIGH (Local level)

Source of Conflict

Type of conflict. 1st level:Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy
Type of conflict. 2nd level:Coal extraction and processing
Water access rights and entitlements
Chemical industries
Specific commodities:Coal
Diesel, naphtha, liquefied petroleum gas, crude phenol and industrial sulfur. [5] 
Water
Chemical products

Project Details and Actors

Project details

China Shenhua is the largest state-owned coal conglomerate in China. Commenced in 2002 [3] and located at Majiata Village in Ulan Moron Town (乌兰木伦镇) in Ordos which borders Shaanxi Province, Shenhua’s CTL project is one of the first and largest of its kind in China and also in the world, involving both direct and indirect liquefaction facilities. The CTL production base covers a total area of 1.735 square kilometers (173.5 hectares).[4]

The project encompasses four areas of coal-related operations, including coal mining, coal-fired thermal power, direct coal liquefaction and indirect coal liquefaction. [3] The coal used by the project comes from the Shenhua Bulianta Coal Mine and the Shenhua Shangwan Coal Mine, both of which are located in the immediate neighborhood of the project site. The main output of petroleum products include diesel, naphtha and liquefied petroleum gas, while supplementary products include industrial crude phenol and industrial sulfur.[5]

The first phase of the project had a production capacity of 1.08 million tons of output a year as of 2013, which was expected to further expand to 5 million tons (phase 2 and phase 3). [2][6] As a capital intensive project, the investment for the first phase of the project is approximately CNY 24.54 billion (USD 3.57 billion).[4], [5]

Project area:173.5 hectares
Level of Investment for the conflictive projectUSD 3.57 billion (CNY 24.54 billion) for the first phase
Type of populationRural
Affected Population:5,752 people (2,402 households in Haolebaoji area)
Start of the conflict:01/01/2015
Company names or state enterprises:China Shenhua Energy Company Limited (神华集团有限责任公司) (China Shenhua/Shenhua) from China - Owner of the CTL project, responsible for the water extraction and wastewater discharge activities
China Shenhua Coal Liquefaction and Chemical Co Ltd (中国神华煤制油化工有限公司) from China - Operating company of the CTL project, responsible for the water extraction and wastewater discharge activities
China Energy Investment Corporation (国家能源投资集团) (CEIC) from China - The company was created after the project/conflict had already started. The company mainly responsible (Shenhua) is now part of CEIC.
Relevant government actors:- Ordos municipality (鄂尔多斯市政府)
- Uxin Banner government (乌审旗政府)
- NPC standing committee in Ordos (鄂尔多斯人大常委会)
- Ejin Horo Banner Environmental Protection Bureau (伊金霍洛旗环保局)
- Ordos Environmental Protection Bureau (鄂尔多斯市环保局)
- Dongcheng District People’s Court in Beijing (北京东城区人民法院)
- Intermediate People’s Courte in Inner Mongolia (内蒙古中级人民法院)
Environmental justice organizations (and other supporters) and their websites, if available:- Greenpeace East Asia (https://www.greenpeace.org.cn/) and Greenpeace International (https://www.greenpeace.org/international/)
- Nature University (自然大学)
- Centre for Legal Advice for Pollution Victims (污染受害者法律帮助中心) http://www.clapv.org/
- Xie Yan, researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Zoology

Conflict & Mobilization

IntensityMEDIUM (street protests, visible mobilization)
Reaction stageIn REACTION to the implementation (during construction or operation)
Groups mobilizing:Farmers
International ejos
Local ejos
Local government/political parties
Neighbours/citizens/communities
Pastoralists
Local scientists/professionals
Forms of mobilization:Blockades
Creation of alternative reports/knowledge
Involvement of national and international NGOs
Lawsuits, court cases, judicial activism
Official complaint letters and petitions
Public campaigns

Impacts

Environmental ImpactsVisible: Biodiversity loss (wildlife, agro-diversity), Food insecurity (crop damage), Loss of landscape/aesthetic degradation, Soil erosion, Deforestation and loss of vegetation cover, Surface water pollution / Decreasing water (physico-chemical, biological) quality, Groundwater pollution or depletion
Health ImpactsPotential: Other Health impacts
Other Health impactsWhile there was no reported visible health impact in the area, the wastewater sample test shows that there are high volumes of hazardous chemicals in the discharged water, which may have health impacts on the local residents and their livestock.
Socio-economical ImpactsVisible: Loss of livelihood, Land dispossession, Loss of landscape/sense of place
Potential: Displacement

Outcome

Project StatusIn operation
Conflict outcome / response:Compensation
Court decision (failure for environmental justice)
Negotiated alternative solution
Technical solutions to improve resource supply/quality/distribution
A legal case was filed but two courts refused to hear the case.
Proposal and development of alternatives:In April 2014, almost a year after Greenpeace's publication of the report, the local government of Haolebaoji announced that Shenhua would stop pumping groundwater in the neighborhood during 2014. [10] Besides, the herders living near water sources in Haolebaoji Township were told by the local government that they would be paid CNY 20,000 (USD 3,200) per person, plus 20,000 per household, as a compensation for loss of water resources to industry, to be paid over three years. [9] In addition, Shenhua pledged that it had fitted the Ordos site with equipment that would allow it to recycle 98% of the water used there and that the water with high concentrations of pollutants would be treated in evaporation ponds.[17]
Do you consider this an environmental justice success? Was environmental justice served?:Not Sure
Briefly explain:It was the first time that Greenpeace confronted a state-owned coal conglomerate in China, which also led to the first time that a state-owned enterprise like Shenhua responded to an NGO’s request and inquiry. To some extent, this is a successful campaign and a milestone. However, local residents still expressed their lack of trust and confidence in the behavior of the corporate due to almost 10 years’ of ongoing petition and resistance that went in vain. Besides, the water access issue that has caused a long-term impact on local residents’ livelihood, including farming activities and their health, could not be resolved in a short term or via financial compensation over just three years. Besides, the public interest litigation related to this case was rejected by two courts, which reflects the challenge in seeking environmental justice through the legal system.

Sources & Materials

Juridical relevant texts related to the conflict (laws, legislations, EIAs, etc)

The Legal Procedure Law of P.R. China (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法), Article 55: For conduct that pollutes environment, infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of vast consumers or otherwise damages the public interest, an authority or relevant organization as prescribed by law may institute an action in a people's court. Where the people's procuratorate finds in the performance of functions any conduct that undermines the protection of the ecological environment and resources, infringes upon consumers' lawful rights and interests in the field of food and drug safety or any other conduct that damages social interest, it may file a lawsuit with the people's court if there is no authority or organization prescribed in the preceding paragraph or the authority or organization prescribed in the preceding paragraph does not file a lawsuit. If the authority or organization prescribed in the preceding paragraph files a lawsuit, the people's procuratorate may support the filing of a lawsuit.
http://www.moj.gov.cn/Department/content/2018-12/25/357_182594.html

Grassland Law of P.R. China (中华 人民共和国草原法)
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/grassland-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-chinese-and-english-text

Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和 国水污染防治法), Article 41 of the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China, passed in 1984 and revised in 1996, prohibits enterprises and public units from discharging wastewater containing toxic pollutants, polluted water containing pathogens or other waste material into seepage wells, seepage pits or caves. Article 42 of the same law states that in areas that are not naturally isolated, enterprises and public units are prohibited from using ditches and pools without proper anti-seepage features to transport or store toxic pollutants, polluted water containing pathogens or other waste materials.
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=029b95a88a65c9d6bdfb&lib=law

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Environmental Protection Regulations (内蒙古自治区环境保护条例), Article 28 of the 2002 revised Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Environmental Protection Regulations states that clean water and wastewater being discharged from industrial processes must be separated, processed independently and reused. Ditches or pools used to transport or store wastewater containing toxic pollutants, polluted water containing pathogens or other waste materials must be treated with anti- seepage techniques.
http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=lar&Gid=773f105191a71c66d524bbdf3daef925bdfb&keyword=&EncodingName=frame_top/frame_top/top_page.aspx?menu_item=law&Search_Mode=&Search_IsTitle=0

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Administrative Measures for Groundwater Management (Pending) (内蒙古自 治区地下水管理办法(征求意见稿)), Article 31 of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Administrative Measures for Groundwater Management (Pending) published on January 4th, 2013, states that the storage or transport of wastewater containing toxic pollutants, polluted water containing pathogens or other waste materials that may pollute groundwater must meet national regulations for the prevention of seepage, in order to protect the quality of groundwater. Anti-seepage projects must include groundwater monitoring facilities that are inspected and approved by water administration agencies before being used. Article 32 states that it is prohibited to use seepage wells, seepage pits or crevices to discharge or dump industrial wastewater, residential wastewater, toxic wastewater and other waste materials that may pollute groundwater; it is also prohibited to use aquifer pores, crevices or abandoned mining pits to store oil, radioactive materials, toxic chemicals or fertilizers.

Water Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国水法), According to Article 28 of the Water Law of the People's Republic of China, no unit or individual may divert, block (store) or drain water in such a way that harms the public interest or the legal rights of others. Administrative Regulations on Water Extraction Licensing and Water Resource Fees issued by the State Council state that reviews of applications for extraction licenses must take into consideration affected parties (in this case, the villagers of Haolebaoji).
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=22552&lib=law

References to published books, academic articles, movies or published documentaries

A short documentary made by Greenpeace (2013) including interviews with local herders that were affected by the water extraction activities of China Shenhua in Ordos since 2003.
https://youtu.be/nMavdhg2f2c

[1] “《噬水之煤》,” Greenpeace East Asia, Jul. 23, 2013. (accessed Aug. 28, 2020).
http://www.greenpeace.org.cn/coal-neimeng-rpt/

[2] D. Patton and F. Wong, “China’s Shenhua drains groundwater for coal project-Greenpeace,” Reuters, Jul. 23, 2013. (accessed Aug. 19, 2020).
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-coal-greenpeace/chinas-shenhua-drains-groundwater-for-coal-project-greenpeace-idUSBRE96M07M20130723

[3] C. Quek, “Coal-to-Chemicals: Shenhua’s Water Grab,” China Water Risk, Aug. 07, 2013. (accessed Aug. 19, 2020).
https://www.chinawaterrisk.org/opinions/coal-to-chemicals-shenhuas-water-grab-2/

[4] “神华鄂尔多斯108万吨直接煤制油,” 化化网. (accessed Aug. 31, 2020).
http://coalchem.anychem.com/project/csclc-eeds-ctl-2

[5] “Thirsty Coal 2: Shenhua’s Water Grab,” Jul. 2013. Accessed: Aug. 28, 2020. [Online].
https://www.banktrack.org/download/thirsty_coal_2/thirsty_coal_2.pdf

[6] J. Li, “Greenpeace accuses Shenhua of ‘drastic’ groundwater drop ,” South China Morning Post, Jul. 24, 2013. (accessed Aug. 30, 2020).
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1289422/greenpeace-report-accuses-shenhua-group-drastic-groundwater-drop?_escaped_fragment_=&edition=hong-kong

[7] Greenpeace, “噬水之煤: 神华鄂尔多斯煤制油项目超采地下水和违法排污调查报告,” Jul. 2013. Accessed: Aug. 28, 2020. [Online].
http://www.greenpeace.org.cn/china/Global/china/publications/campaigns/climate-energy/2013/shenhua2013-rpt.pdf

[8] B. Li, “神华煤制油项目与民争水 鄂尔多斯草原生态告急,” 东方财富网, Jul. 26, 2013. (accessed Aug. 26, 2020).
http://cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsxw/201307/t20130726_4081978.html

[9] J. Feng, “煤企神华向NGO让步始末 ,” Southern Weekly (南方周末), May 01, 2014. (accessed Aug. 27, 2020).
https://chinadialogue.net/zh/4/42311/

[10] J. Feng, “How NGOs forced China’s biggest coal company to back down over groundwater extraction,” China Dialogue, May 19, 2014. (accessed Aug. 27, 2020).
https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/6977-how-ngos-forced-china-s-biggest-coal-company-to-back-down-over-groundwater-extraction/

[11] “神华煤化工决定将逐步停止抽取鄂尔多斯地下水,” Greenpeace, Apr. 08, 2014. (accessed Aug. 28, 2020).
https://www.greenpeace.org.cn/shenhua-drop-of-coal-water-plan/

[12] “绿色和平就神华鄂尔多斯煤制油项目致神华集团的公开信,” Greenpeace, Aug. 27, 2013. (accessed Aug. 27, 2020).
http://www.greenpeace.org.cn/open-letter-to-shenhua/

[13] P. Deng and H. Lammi, “Why the world’s biggest coal company has backed down,” Greenpeace , Apr. 08, 2014. (accessed Aug. 26, 2020).
https://wayback.archive-it.org/9650/20200403032443/http://p3-raw.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/worlds-biggest-coal-company-backs-down-the-wh/blog/48842/

[14] “中国神华香港业绩发布会收到NGO请愿信,” 证券时报网, Sep. 02, 2013. (accessed Aug. 28, 2020).
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/news-7855.html

[15] J. Yang, “专家再呼放开环境公益诉讼主体资格,” Caixin (财新), Oct. 25, 2013. (accessed Aug. 25, 2020).
http://m.china.caixin.com/m/2013-10-25/100595542.html

[16] K. Zhang, “神华两公司被指污染环境 北京内蒙古法院不立案,” 第一财经日报, Oct. 24, 2013. (accessed Aug. 28, 2020).
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20131024/020017090983.shtml?agt=267?agt

[17] J.-F. Tremblay, “Conciliatory Words From A Chinese Coal Giant,” Chemical & Engineering News, May 26, 2014. (accessed Aug. 27, 2020).
https://cen.acs.org/articles/92/i21/Conciliatory-Words-Chinese-Coal-Giant.html?type=paidArticleContent

[18] “煤制油前景看好,国家能源集团再建煤直接液化制油二、三线项目,” 化工网, Aug. 15, 2018. (accessed Aug. 30, 2020).
https://chem.vogel.com.cn/c/2018-08-15/512083.shtml

[19] R. Tao, “一条生产线 煤海变‘油田,’” 中国煤炭网, Apr. 29, 2019. (accessed Aug. 30, 2020).
http://www.ccoalnews.com/special/201904/29/c105018.html

Meta information

Contributor:EnvJustice, ICTA-UAB, BW
Last update19/08/2020
Conflict ID:5180

Images

 

Greenpeace representatives spoke to media and investors at Shenhua's 2013 mid-year result press event

Source and credit: Greenpeace, https://wayback.archive-it.org/9650/20200403032443/http:/p3-raw.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/worlds-biggest-coal-company-backs-down-the-wh/blog/48842/

Dried water well near local residents' household

Source and credit: Deutsche Welle, photo taken by Qiu Bo from Greenpeace https://www.dw.com/zh/%E4%BD%8E%E8%80%97%E6%A8%A1%E8%8C%83%E7%85%A4%E5%8C%96%E5%B7%A5%E9%A1%B9%E7%9B%AE%E5%AE%9E%E4%B8%BA%E9%AB%98%E8%80%97%E9%AB%98%E6%B1%A1%E5%85%B8%E5%9E%8B/a-16969520"

A local farmer, Zhang Dadi, prays for rain in the middle of his corn field that he cannot irrigate

Source and credit: Greenpeace, photo taken by Qiu Bo, https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/how-chinas-shenhua-group-is-plundering-water-supplies/

Experts hosted seminar to discuss the public interest litigation regarding the Shenhua case

Source and credit: Greenpeace East Asia, https://www.greenpeace.org.cn/china/Global/china/image/2014/climate/law-su-to-shenhua.jpg